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This paper presents a risk assessment methodology for high pressure CO2 pipelines developed at the Health and
Safety Laboratory (HSL) as part of the EU FP7 CO2Pipehaz project. Until recently, risk assessment of dense phase
and  supercritical CO2 pipelines has been problematic because of the lack of suitable source term and integral conse-
quence models that handle the complex behaviour of CO2 appropriately. The risk assessment presented uses Phast,
a  commercially available source term and dispersion model that has been recently updated to handle the effects of
solid  CO2. A test case pipeline was input to Phast and dispersion footprints to different levels of harm (dangerous
toxic  load and probit values) were obtained for a set of pipeline speciﬁc scenarios. HSL’s risk assessment tool Quick-
Risk  was then used to calculate the individual and societal risk surrounding the pipeline. Knowledge gaps that were
encountered such as: harm criteria, failure rates and release scenarios were identiﬁed and are discussed.
Crown Copyright © 2013 Published by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of The Institution of Chemical Engineers. 
Keywords: CCS; Carbon dioxide; Pipelines; Phast; Risk assessment; CO2Pipehaz
els that are able to accurately model the formation of solid
CO2 which, up until now, has not been investigated in detail.
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urrent opinion suggests that carbon capture and storage
CCS) is an important part of the strategy to help reduce CO2
missions and prevent global warming. It involves a three-
tep-process: capture and compression, transport (onshore
nd possibly offshore) by pressurised pipeline and injection
o a geological storage site offshore (DNV, 2008). CCS implies
he transportation of large quantities of CO2, which if released
ould cause signiﬁcant harm.
There are a number of projects relating to CCS currently
ngoing such as CO2Pipehaz, a project partially funded by the
K’s Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and the European Com-
ission (EC). The overall purpose of this project is to address∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 01298 218123.
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ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.psep.2013.09.002what occurs following an accidental release of CO2 from high-
pressure pipelines, such as:
• Accurate predictions of ﬂuid phase;
• Discharge rate;
• Emergency isolation; and
• Atmospheric dispersion.
The results will feed into emergency response planning and
will be used to determine minimum safe distances to popu-
lated areas. Part of the project includes the development of
multi-phase heterogeneous discharge and dispersion mod-, ju.lynne.saw@hsl.gsi.gov.uk (J.L. Saw), d.lisbona@shefﬁeld.ac.uk
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essmFig. 1 – CO2 risk ass
Large scale and small-scale experiments are also part of the
project and will help validate the dispersion results from the
developed model. This paper focuses on the development of
a risk assessment methodology using integral consequence
modelling, the outline of which is shown in Fig. 1.
The risk assessment method requires the combination of
the probability of a hazardous event occurring and the con-
sequence of that event causing a fatality. A typical procedure,
which is applicable to substances other than CO2, comprises
the following processes:
• Establish the failure modes and the type of release that
results (catastrophic rupture, continuous leak, etc.);
• Establish the source terms (release rate, mass, momentum,
energy, phase, etc.);
• Estimate the consequences resulting from the release using
appropriate integral dispersion models and harm criteria;
• Choose a failure position within the length of the pipeline
being considered and determine suitable weather condi-
tions local to the release site; and
• Carry out the risk assessment for:
◦ Individual risk (hypothetical individual) and/or
◦ Societal risk (all surrounding population).
Currently there is no ofﬁcial EU position on the method-
ology for estimating risks for pipelines. Mendes et al. (2011)
carried out a comprehensive review of the risk criteria
and associated risk assessment methodologies of different
countries and concluded that a range of assumptions is in useent methodology.
worldwide. As part of the CO2Pipehaz project Dupuis (2013)
examined current risk assessment approaches used for CO2
pipelines and concluded that the methodologies were devel-
oped for dangerous goods other than CO2. The report also
concludes that the speciﬁc properties of CO2 lead to speciﬁc
risks and that these should be considered in the methodol-
ogy. The method presented here is applicable for the example
CO2 pipeline used in the CO2Pipehaz project and may not
be applicable for other types of CO2 release such as vessel
failure. It is also not applicable for pipeline failures of other
substances, unless solid formation is considered likely. How-
ever, the assumptions and the derived event tree could be
adjusted where appropriate to allow application for other risk
assessment purposes.
The purpose of this paper is to present a generic method-
ology applicable to CO2 pipelines so that users can apply
assumptions speciﬁc to their region. This paper does not
intend to recommend speciﬁc input values for use in CO2 risk
assessments because some countries may have very speciﬁc
and/or different guidance, and as such, these values should be
used in preference. Generic assumptions should not be treated
as standard practice without further examination.
2.  Carbon  dioxide  harm  criteria
Although CO2 is not classiﬁed as toxic, it still has major acci-
dent potential, particularly in relation to CCS (McGillivray and
Wilday, 2009). Exposure for several hours to a concentration
of 3% CO2 affects the human respiratory system while the
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Fig. 2 – Event trees for guillotine failure/full-bore rupture of a dense phase or supercritical CO2 pipeline. Notes: (1) the
percentage of CO2 deposited as a solid will need to be estimated; however, it is likely to be less than the percentage of solid
produced; The sublimation rate will also have to be estimated. Methodologies for these are currently knowledge gaps. (2)
The ﬂow rate needs to take account of deposited solid (see note 1). CFD and experimental evidence discussed suggests that
the jet loses little momentum from impact with crater walls. If there are other relevant topography/local structures then a
low momentum release may need to be considered instead. (3) The ﬂow rate needs to take account of deposited solid (see
note 1). Leaks are likely to be small enough that impact with the crater/cavern wall will remove signiﬁcant momentum
(unless a large leak approaches the release rate of a guillotine fracture). A cautious best estimate approach would be to
model the release as a downwards impacting jet. (4) For a small leak the quantity of solid deposited is likely to be very low
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ecipient is at rest, with headaches and restricted breathing
ecoming apparent. Increasing the concentration to 7% can
esult in unconsciousness within a few minutes and exposure
o 17% CO2 can result in coma and death within one minute
DNV, 2008).
There are a number of different methods available to cal-
ulate levels of harm such as: dangerous toxic load (Franks
t al., 1996), probits (VROM, 2005a) and concentration (URS,
009). The dangerous toxic load and probit methods are based
n fatality whereas concentration is usually used as a mea-
ure of injury or harm, for example, work place exposure
imits.2 The relationship between concentration, time and
atality is complex for CO2 and as such a unique probit func-
ion is not currently widely available (RIVM, 2009). However,
SE’s dose criteria, SLOT (Speciﬁed Level of Toxicity) and
LOD (Signiﬁcant Likelihood of Death), can be used to derive
n approximate probit (McGillivray and Wilday, 2009) where
equired. Risk calculations are usually based on fatality rather
han harm or injuries, therefore dose and probits are more
ppropriate than concentrations during risk assessment. In
eneral, the harm criteria chosen should be suitable for the
ite being modelled and the guidance for the country where
he release occurs.2 http://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/priced/eh40.pdf.3.  Pipeline  release  scenarios
Identiﬁcation of suitable pipeline scenarios is an important
part of the process and will affect the size of the dispersion
results. Pipeline failures can result in full-bore rupture which
is considered to be the worst-case scenario because it repre-
sents the situation where the pipeline is completely cleaved
in two. Large and small holes are also possible and can occur
anywhere around the circumference of the pipeline. In reality,
the holes created by a pipeline failure are largely dependent on
various fracture mechanics (Bilio et al., 2009), but for CO2, the
exact mechanism is currently unknown and is a key a knowl-
edge gap. In the mean time, available guidance for hole sizes is
usually generic and will apply to a range of substances, usually
natural gas. Incident frequency data in terms of hole size gath-
ered by UKOPA between 1962 and 2010 can be used (McConnell
and Haswell, 2011) and other general guidance can be found
in Mendes et al. (2011). Paltrinieri (2010) deﬁnes hole sizes as
a percentage of the pipeline diameter: 22–44% for medium
holes and 10% for small holes. Normally all three hole sizes
are considered for a risk assessment, but smaller holes may
be neglected if the dispersion model does not produce results.
For CCS, the transport pipelines are likely to be buried
underground, and for full-bore ruptures and large holes (with
a release rate approaching that of a full-bore rupture), the vio-
lent nature of the failure forms a crater around the release
point. The interaction of the plume with the crater is not well
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or suFig. 3 – Event tree for holes in a dense phase 
understood, but CFD (Computational Fluid Dynamics) work
carried out by HSE for natural gas pipelines in the 1990s shows
that the velocity of the jet is largely unaffected (see for exam-
ple: Lea (1996a,b), Zhou and Lea (1997), Zhou et al. (1997) and
Zhou (1999)). Work carried out by the Energy Institute (2010)
and applied to CO2 also supports this viewpoint. As part of
the CO2 COOLTRANS project, experiments by Allason et al.
(2012) show that for punctures in clay soil, the force of the
initial release is strong enough to lift and break apart the soil
but not strong enough to blast it away. Instead, underground
caverns are formed around the release point with sufﬁcient
cracks to allow the CO2 to escape to the surface, albeit with
reduced momentum when compared to scenarios where a dis-
tinct crater is formed. This behaviour could also be applicable
for large holes with a release rate much smaller than that of
a full-bore rupture. However, Allason et al. (2012) found that
sandy soils and some clay soils produce distinct craters. Thepercritical CO2 pipeline. See Fig. 2 for notes.
majority of dispersion models are unable to model crater for-
mation and its interaction with the plume and as such, the
crater is usually ignored (Koornneef et al., 2010; VROM, 2005b;
DNV, 2010 are some examples). For low momentum releases
(punctures and large holes with small release rates) the release
can be estimated using a downwards impinging release with
a reduced velocity.
It is possible for the temperature and pressure of the
released CO2 to fall below the triple point (triple point
pressure is 4.187 barg and the triple point temperature is
216.6 K) and when this happens, the formation of solid CO2
occurs. The solid CO2 can either stay within the CO2 jet as
evaporating particles or it can ‘snowout’ to form a bank of sub-
limating solid CO2. The dispersion results will vary depending
on which scenario occurs and at present this it is considered
to be a key knowledge gap. To resolve this, there has been
extensive research experimentally and theoretically into the
Process Safety and Environmental Protection 9 2 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 17–26 21
m
s
o
t
D
r
d
o
t
M
F
i
a
d
u
j
t
r
w
o
s
s
e
s
i
a
e
r
t
d
4
F
i
o
t
ﬁ
a
i
2
n
i
r
U
r
o
(
h
i
c
0
t
t
r
s
l
e
uechanics of snowout. Small-scale pipeline releases of unob-
tructed jets have been carried out and so far no experimental
bservations of snowout have been made, and the theory
ends to support this (Witlox et al., 2009; Allason et al., 2012;
ixon et al., 2012). The solid CO2 is expected to evaporate very
apidly within the plume; so even though the plume may touch
own, the solid particles evaporate before it does. Only highly
bstructed releases (e.g. from buried pipelines) are expected
o result in the formation of solid banks (Allason et al., 2012;
azzoldi et al. 2008).
For full-bore ruptures/guillotine failures of a CO2 pipeline,
ig. 2 shows the event tree that was derived based on exper-
mental and modelling results from a literature review, and
lso expert knowledge. Fig. 3 shows the event tree that was
erived for large and small holes in a CO2 pipeline. The
nobstructed releases can be used for situations where the
et is directed vertically upwards, angled from the horizon-
al or when it becomes grounded, whereas the obstructed
eleases are representative of releases that are directed down-
ards into the ground or where impact against the crater
ccurs. There is a large amount of uncertainty regarding the
ource term for banks of sublimating CO2 and as such these
cenarios have been neglected and are labelled N/A in the
vent tree. This risk assessment uses 24 out of a possible 36
cenarios.
Representative UK weather used by HSE (D5 and F2) is
ncluded in the event tree, but it should be changed if
ctual weather conditions are known. The event tree can be
xpanded to include more  weather categories, but it is not
ecommended to use less than two. For this risk assessment,
he general public are assumed to be located indoors and out-
oors.
.  Failure  rates
ailure rate estimation requires the number of CO2 pipeline
ncidents and an estimation of the corresponding total length
f CO2 pipeline. From these, a failure rate, for example, in
erms of per metre per year can be calculated if there are suf-
cient data available, otherwise predictive models and tools
re necessary.
The number of estimated CO2 pipeline releases considered
n failure rate calculations varies from 10 (Gale and Davison,
004) to 36 (Koornneef et al., 2010), mainly because they were
ot derived over the same time period. Sometimes scenar-
os are neglected from failure rate calculations because the
elease mechanisms could not be determined with conﬁdence.
nder-reporting is also problematic, especially for smaller
eleases.
There is also some uncertainty relating to the total length
f pipeline currently operating because estimates of 2600 km
Gale and Davison, 2004) to 6300 km (Koornneef et al., 2010)
ave been proposed. The majority of CO2 pipelines are located
n the USA, so most estimates neglect pipelines from other
ountries.
For failure rates used speciﬁcally for CO2, a range between
.105 per km per year and 0.64 per km per year was identiﬁed
hrough literature review (McGillivray et al., 2013), although
he majority were located at the lower end of the range. Failure
ates are largely dependent on the pipeline speciﬁcation, the
ubstance involved and the hole size and, currently, there is a
ack of predictive models that are able to do this with precision,
specially for CO2. Calculated failure rates should therefore be
sed with caution.5.  Dispersion  modelling
CO2 behaves as a dense gas when it is released from high
pressure pipelines and as such only a dense gas dispersion
model will give appropriate results. However, Mazzoldi et al.
(2008) suggest that passive dispersion may be more  appropri-
ate for banks of CO2 sublimating in winds greater than 2.3 m/s
(dense modelling applies below this cut off), and may need to
be considered. Not all models can handle the complex thermo-
dynamics of CO2 (i.e. solid formation) so the choice of model
and source conditions should be decided with care.
Koornneef et al. (2010) used the Morrow model for rup-
ture, which handles non-stationary, two-phase outﬂow from
large pipelines. The jet properties and possible rainout of solid
CO2 were modelled using a spray release model, the results of
which were used as input to a dense gas dispersion model
(based on the SLAB model (Ermak, 1990)). For possible rainout
of CO2, the sublimation from a solid ‘pool’ was modelled using
a dense gas evaporating pool model. The US Department of
Energy (US DOE, 2007) also used SLAB in their CO2 pipeline risk
assessment methodology. ALOHA has been used to model CO2
(URS, 2009; Mazzoldi et al., 2008) and so has DEGADIS (Kruse
and Tekiela, 1996; Cameron-Cole, 2005). Vendrig et al. (2003),
the Energy Institute (2010) and McGillivray and Wilday (2009)
all used Phast v.6.54 and earlier. Further examination of dense
gas dispersion models can be found in McGillivray et al. (2013).
CFD models are not considered for this work but can be used
where appropriate instead of integral models.
Phast version 6.7 (DNV, 2011) is a suite of discharge and dis-
persion models that in recent years (version 6.6 and later) has
been updated to account for the presence of solid CO2. The tool
does this by assuming that CO2 has liquid properties above
the triple point and solid properties below it. However, Phast
can only account for solid CO2 at atmospheric pressure and it
therefore only applies once the CO2 has expanded to atmo-
spheric pressure and during dispersion. Solid CO2 will not
be considered inside the pipeline or just after exit. Snowout,
i.e. deposition of solid CO2 is also not considered. Inclusion
of the thermodynamic properties is an important element of
the CO2Pipehaz project and as such Phast v6.7 was used for
this work. McGillivray et al. (2013) examines a range of other
possible consequence models.
An empirical formula developed by Span and Wagner (1996)
is now considered to be the preferred equation of state for
modelling the thermodynamics of CO2 (EON, 2011). Span Wag-
ner is valid for all temperature and pressure combinations
that result from high pressure CO2 pipeline releases, and
unlike the Soave Redlich–Kwong and Peng-Robinson equa-
tions of state, it is valid in the near-critical region. As part
of the CO2PIPETRANS project, Witlox (2011) and Witlox et al.
(2012) have compared experimental measures of liquid den-
sity against the density calculated by a number of different
equations of state: Soave Redlich–Kwong (default in Phast
for CO2), Span Wagner and Peng Robinson. Witlox (2011) and
Witlox et al. (2012) conﬁrm the results of the EON report
and found that Span Wagner predicted the closet match
in terms of liquid density to the experimental results from
the Coriolis-ﬂow metre, followed by Peng Robinson and then
Phast’s default (Soave Redlich–Kwong). Access to the Peng
Robinson equation in Phast v6.7 is only possible through use
of the multicomponent mixture option, and for CO2, this is
not recommended because solid CO2 is not accounted for in
the multicomponent mode. Despite this, all three predictions
of density are comparable to the experimental results, and as
22  Process Safety and Environmental Protection 9 2 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 17–26such, Phast’s default equation of state is still ﬁt for purpose.
A new equation of state for CO2 that is valid for a wide range
of conditions (including supercritical) is being investigated as
part of the CO2Pipehaz project. Its validation for streams of
CO2 containing impurities such as SO2 is also being consid-
ered.
The consequence modelling for this example is based on
two weather (atmospheric stability/wind speed) categories: D5
and F2. Fig. 4 shows the Phast results for HSE’s dangerous
toxic load criteria (Franks et al., 1996; HSE, 2008): the foot-
prints were obtained at the LD01 (1.5 × 1040 ppm8 min), LD10
(4.22 × 1040 ppm8 min) and LD50 (1.5 × 1041 ppm8 min) dose
criteria. The blue contour corresponds to LD01 (largest con-
tour), the green contour to LD10 (middle contour) and the
black contour to LD50 (smallest contour). A test case high pres-
sure CO2 pipeline was used and the results shown are for an
obstructed jet release scenario from a large hole in D5 weather
for an outdoor recipient. For this case the LD01 (1% probabil-
ity of death) contour extends approximately 505 m downwind
of the release, the maximum width is approximately 164 m
and occurs at 339 m downwind. As this is a continuous release
no upwind extent is predicted by Phast, but in reality upwind
spread would occur.
6.  Risk  calculation
The probability and potential consequences (the latter is
supplied from the integral dispersion model, such as those
presented in Fig. 4) can then be combined to obtain the risk
results. For example, individual risk contours and/or societal
risk FN curves can be obtained, as well as other represen-
tations of risk, although the choice will depend on what is
being modelled and how the user chooses to represent them
(examples are deﬁned later in this section).
HSE use the concept of interaction distance for the esti-
mation of pipeline individual risk in its in-house Land
Use Planning tools, TPRAM (Toxic Pipeline Risk Assessment
Method) for toxics (based on the earlier PRAM method (Carter,
1991)) and MISHAP (see for example, Bilio and Kinsman (1997))
for ﬂammable substances. The interaction distance concept is
explained in IGEM/TD/2 (2008b) for natural gas pipelines and
also BSI (2008) for substances other than natural gas, and both
are applicable for individual risk and societal risk.
This work uses QuickRisk (Lisbona and Wardman, 2011;
Wardman et al., 2007), a tool developed for HSE to estimate
societal risk. For this work it was used to estimate the societal
risk and also the individual risk associated with an exam-
ple CO2 pipeline. In reality, a pipeline is never completely
straight: it can move vertically and laterally to follow the shape
of the land to the side and underneath. Despite this, most
pipeline risk assessments assume a ﬂat earth scenario and a
straight pipeline, causing less realistic results. This work uses
QuickRisk’s new approach which allows the pipeline trajec-
tory to vary. The results here are based on a ﬂat earth scenario,
but other work is being carried out to investigate topography
(Lisbona et al., 2014) using QuickRisk.
Most current risk calculation tools will calculate the risk at
one point, and while this is useful for vessels, it is not use-
ful for pipeline releases which can consist of multiple release
locations along its length. The results from QuickRisk are for
multiple release points along a 1 km section of pipeline, the
location of which is anonymous. Other risk assessment tools
are available and can be used provided appropriate risk calcu-
lations are included in the tool.There are a variety of different approaches for generic
pipeline risk assessment, usually depending on the regula-
tions of the country where the pipeline is operating, and
these are summarised by Mendes et al. (2011). Schork et al.
(2012) have reviewed societal risk criteria for the UK  and
the Netherlands, and it also describes options for pipeline
risk assessment. Currently no CO2 speciﬁc risk assessment
methodology exists.
6.1.  Frequency  calculation
The direction that a released plume of carbon dioxide will
take is largely dependent on the orientation of the wind, and
may point anywhere on a 360◦ windrose (assuming the release
point is at the centre). For each direction (n sectors) of inter-
est around the windrose, the frequency is calculated and then
summed over the entire windrose to give the overall frequency
of the event.
The frequency calculation is based on a number of key
elements as shown in Eq. (1): the failure rate f (event); the
probability of a particular weather category (Pweather) and the
direction of the wind (Pwind direction). P is the precision value
chosen and represents the number of subdivisions per wind
rose sector that are considered in the calculation of the fre-
quency (for example, if the precision = 30 and there are 12
sectors, then the calculations would be performed at 1◦ inter-
vals around the release point). This in turn can affect the
accuracy of the risk calculation because the higher the pre-
cision value, the larger the number of f,n pairs for the societal
risk calculation.
f = f (event) × Pweather ×
Pwinddirection
P × nsectors (1)
UK observational weather data can be obtained from orga-
nisations such as the UK Meteorological Ofﬁce, and from this,
Pweather and Pwind direction can be calculated. The weather data
is normally taken from the closest weather station to the
release. The frequency calculation needs to be repeated for
each scenario in the risk assessment, and for this example,
this means for all 24 scenarios in Figs. 2 and 3. This calculation
is required for individual and societal risk.
6.2.  Individual  risk
Individual risk is based on the probability that a given person
may be harmed during the course of a year from the effects
of a major hazard. One value of individual risk is assigned
to a particular person from a given installation or section of
pipeline, though the overall value can be based on a number
of different loss of containment events.
Results are presented in terms of risk contours (Fig. 5) and
risk transects (Fig. 6) for individual risk of death. The individual
risk contours have not been overlaid against a map  to preserve
the anonymity of the pipeline location.
The black line in Fig. 5 shows the pipeline route, and the
coloured lines correspond to different levels of risk: 10 cpm
(red), 1 cpm (green) and 0.5 cpm (blue). These risk levels are
measured in terms of chances per million (cpm) of receiving
the dangerous dose or worse and are standard HSE values used
for Land Use Planning. Fig. 5 shows the individual risk along
the length of the pipeline.Fig. 5 shows that an ‘exclusion corridor’ is created for indi-
vidual risk along CO2 pipelines rather than the traditional
Process Safety and Environmental Protection 9 2 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 17–26 23
Fig. 4 – An example Dangerous Toxic Load footprint calculated by Phast. LD01 – blue contour (largest), LD10–green contour
(middle) and LD50 – black contour (smallest). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is
referred to the web version of this article.)
Fig. 5 – Individual risk contours. (For interpretation of the
references to colour in the citation of this ﬁgure, the reader
is referred to the web version of this article.)
Fig. 6 – Individual risk transects.zones that are produced for substances such as methane. This
is because the dose equation for CO2 is highly dependent on
the concentration which causes a cliff edge effect, and thus
three sets of risk lines that are close together. This effect
means that accurate dispersion results are required because
a model that underestimates the hazard contours may result
in a risk corridor that is too narrow and likewise a model that
overpredicts may result in a risk corridor that is too wide.
A risk transect shows the individual risk to a hypotheti-
cal individual (per year), as a function of the perpendicular
distance from the centre of the pipeline (per m,  typically) at
a speciﬁc location. Fig. 6 shows that the risk at the pipeline
is approximately 2.2 × 10−4 per year and falls to zero within
1 km of either side of the pipeline. This risk transect applies to
a speciﬁc location on the pipeline and, provided the pipeline
is not assumed to be straight, may vary at different points
along its length. Examples of other risk transects for pipelines
can be found, for example, in Morgan (1989,1995), Hill and
Catmur (1994) as well as the more  recent standards: British
Standard PD8010 Part 3 (2008), IGEM/TD/1 Edition 5 (2008a) and
IGEM/TD/2 (2008b).
Other measures of risk are available, for example, HSE
use the Tolerability of Risk (TOR) framework (HSE, 2001) to
determine if risks are Broadly Acceptable (1 × 10−6 per year),
Tolerable if ALARP (between 1 × 10−6 and 1 × 10−4 per year) or
Intolerable (1 × 10−4 per year for the general public). This crite-
ria, or similar, can be used to assess the level of individual risk
to people from the pipeline.
6.3.  Societal  risk
Individual risk is a useful measure, but it does not account
for the potential for a major hazard accident, such as a CO2
pipeline release, to affect large numbers of people simulta-
neously. Societal risk addresses this aspect; however, it may
not be as useful for pipelines that are located in wide open
spaces with no nearby population.
6.3.1.  Population
The consequence most commonly considered in the estima-
tion of societal risk for major hazards, such as CO2 pipelines,
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Fig. 7 – FN curve against example criteria from BSI PD8010
(2008).is usually death. By notation, the consequence resulting in a
number of fatalities is n, and the likelihood or frequency of
that consequence occurring is f (from Eq. (1)). On this basis,
societal risk is a combination of f and n values. For an event
affecting a human population at a given orientation in relation
to the source of the hazard, this results in what is known as an
f–n pair. The calculation of the n value associated with a major
hazard scenario affecting a given population is based on the
size of the contour from the dispersion model (i.e. the num-
ber of people within it). This example uses three measures
of harm (i.e. the 1%, 10% and 50% fatalities deﬁned earlier)
as described by the Total Risk of Death (TROD) methodology
(Rushton and Carter, 2009). Weightings in the TROD method
help avoid double and triple counting the population. This
arises because areas of the 1% harm contour are also included
within the 10% and 50% contours and the weightings prevent
the population within the 50% contour potentially being killed
up to three times. The population associated within each harm
contour can then be summed to give the total number of fatal-
ities for this set of contours. To account for changes in wind
direction, the contour is rotated around the release point at
intervals depending on the chosen precision, and for this case
it is every 1◦ rotation. The population is summed for each rota-
tion as before and gives potential fatalities for a given wind
direction.
Societal risk calculations may not be as important for wide
open spaces with no population as they are for pipelines that
could potentially be close to towns and cities. Where soci-
etal risk calculations apply, the population data should be
obtained in the vicinity of the pipeline, and in the UK, this
can be obtained from the National Population Database (Smith
et al., 2005) which provides the data in 100 m × 100 m grids.
Data are provided from the UK census and include residen-
tial and business populations as well as transient populations
such as roads and stadia. Multipliers are often applied to the
population data to allow distinction between the day and
night populations and even vulnerable and non-vulnerable
populations. The rotation method is repeated for each popu-
lation type of interest. Appropriate population data should be
sourced that is applicable to the country where the pipeline is
operating.
6.3.2.  Societal  risk  outputs
Societal risk can be represented in the following ways as
described by Lisbona and Wardman (2011):
• Numerically – in the form of a risk integral;
• Graphically – in the form of FN curves; and
• Geographically
The most commonly used numerical representation of
societal risk is the Expectation Value (EV) which is the aver-
age number of persons receiving a speciﬁed level of harm per
year. When the harm criterion chosen is the risk of fatality,
as it is here, it is often referred to as the Potential Loss of Life
(PLL). Nmax is another numerical approach which focuses on
the event with the worst consequences (i.e. maximum num-
ber of fatalities), but it discounts all other scenarios which
contribute to the overall risk.
FN curves are plots of cumulative frequency (F) for vari-
ous accident scenarios against the number of casualties (N)
or more,  associated with the modelled scenarios. Fig. 7 is an
example of a FN curve which is a graphical representation of
societal risk and in this case uses a criterion line deﬁned byBSI (2008). However, there is no universal agreement in the
criteria used for comparing FN curves against FN criterion
lines (Lisbona and Wardman, 2011). The document ‘Reducing
Risks Protecting People’ (R2P2) (HSE, 2001) deﬁnes one crite-
rion as the risk of an accident causing the death of 50 or more
people in a single event should be regarded as Intolerable if
the frequency is estimated to be more  than one in ﬁve thou-
sand per year (2 × 10−4 per year). Below the criterion line the
risk is Broadly Acceptable and above the line it is Tolerable if
ALARP.
Geographical representations are the most efﬁcient way of
indicating levels of the overall societal risk faced by differ-
ent populations in areas located near the CO2 pipeline. They
are especially useful in risk communication between spatial
planners, local authorities, or regulators in deciding the tol-
erability of risks surrounding a pipeline or any major hazard
site. For geographical representations, the summation of fre-
quency and estimated number of fatalities can be applied on
a grid by grid square basis to produce a PLL density per grid
square. This can be output in the form of a PLL density map
as shown in Fig. 8 and indicates geographical locations where
the PLL density is above criterion values (e.g. 10−5 fatalities per
year per hectare). Normally the PLL density plot is overlaid on
a map,  but to preserve the anonymity of the pipeline location,
this has not been done here.
Process Safety and Environmental Protection 9 2 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 17–26 25
Fig. 8 – PLL density maps.
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by  pipelines – a review of uncertainties and their impacts. J..  Conclusions
his paper presents a generic methodology that can be used to
ssess the individual and societal risks for high-pressure CO2
ipelines. Further information on the assumptions used for
he test case pipeline can be found in McGillivray et al. (2013).
he main conclusions are:
 The majority of source term models and integral disper-
sion models cannot handle the complex thermodynamic
behaviour of CO2. This has been identiﬁed as a key knowl-
edge gap.
 The limitations of current source term models prevent
accurate representation of the vapourisation rate from sub-
limating banks of solid CO2. Consequently the dispersion
from these scenarios cannot be modelled with accuracy and
are neglected.
 The majority of source term models cannot handle the for-
mation of craters and their subsequent interaction with the
CO2 plume. In some cases the source term may need to be
amended to suit the scenario, but there are no clear guide-
lines on how this should be done.
 There is a lack of operational data to allow accurate CO2
pipelines failure rates to be estimated from historical data.
There is also a lack of appropriate predictive tools available
to calculate the failure rate. However, there are some generic
failure rates available based on limited data.
 Individual and societal risk results for pipelines can account
for multiple release locations and also variations in the
pipeline direction (i.e. the presence of bends). These give
more  realistic results than traditional methods where, for
example, straight pipelines are assumed.
 The results presented are for a test case pipeline, and as
such the levels of risk may change when the method is
applied to pipelines with different speciﬁcations.
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